

Message Text

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 USNATO 2146

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: MPOL, NATO

SUBJECT: COUNCIL OPERATIONS EXERCISE COMMITTEE MEETING,
APRIL 17, 1975

REFS: A. USNATO 1975; B. STATE 85640; C. USNATO 1732;
D. STATE 77049; E. USNATO 1671

SUMMARY. AT APRIL 17 MEETING, COUNCIL OPERATIONS EXERCISE COMMITTEE (COEC) APPROVED OPTION C FOR THE CONFIGURATION OF THE PILOT SECURE VOICE PROJECT AT NATO HQ. TURNING TO DRAFT REPORT TO THE DPC ON EXERCISE WINTEX 75, COEC CONSIDERED A NUMBER OF AMENDMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS. OF NOTE WAS A PROPOSAL BY CANADA TO BROADEN THE SCOPE OF THE REPORT TO INCLUDE DEFINITIVE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE EXERCISES, AND A SUGGESTED REDRAFT OF PARA 13 BY UK WHICH PUTS MORE STRONGLY THE CASE FOR A MULTINATIONAL COMMITTEE TO OPERATE IN FUTURE EXERCISES WHEN THE DPC IS NOT ITSELF PARTICIPATING. IS WILL PREPARE A SECOND DRAFT REPORT BASED UPON INPUTS RECEIVED. MISSION WILL FORWARD SECOND DRAFT TO WASHINGTON UPON RECEIPT.

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END SUMMARY.

1. COEC CONSIDERED THE THREE OPTIONS FOR THE CONFIGURATION OF THE PILOT SECURE VOICE PROJECT AT NATO HQ (REF A). AFTER

A SHORT DISCUSSION ON TECHNICAL MATTERS, COEC APPROVED OPTION C (REF B).

2. ON THE DRAFT REPORT TO THE DPC FOR EXERCISE WINTEX 75 (REF C), COEC CHAIRMAN (MACBRIEN) DISTRIBUTED MSS/75/29 CONTAINING THE FOLLOWING SUGGESTED AMENDMENTS TO AC/237-WPX99:

A. PARAGRAPH 9, SECOND SENECE: DELETE THE SENTENCE AND REPLACE IT BY THE FOLLOWING: "THE CHAIRMAN OF THE MILITARY COMMITTEE CONVEYED THE VIEWS OF THE MEMBERS OF HIS COMMITTEE REGARDING SACLANT'S WARNINGS MESSAGE."

B. PARAGRAPH 10, SECOND SENTENCE: DELETE THE SENTENCE AND REPLACE IT BY THE FOLLOWING: "THE CHAIRMAN OF THE MILITARY COMMITTEE CONVEYED THE VIEWS OF THE MEMBERS OF HIS COMMITTEE WITH REGARD TO SACEUR'S THREE WARNING MESSAGES AND SACLANT'S RELEASE REQUEST."

C. PARAGRAPH 11: AMEND THE BEGINNING OF THE SECOND SENTENCE TO READ: "AFTER TAKING NOTE OF THE VIEWS OF THE MEMBERS OF THE MILITARY COMMITTEE THE SECRETARY GENERAL...."

D. PARAGRAPH 12: ADD A NEW SENTENCE TO READ: "THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS BY WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES MERITS FURTHER CONSIDERATION WITHIN THE ALLIANCE."

E. PARAGRAPH 15: REPLACE TEXT WITH THE FOLLOWING:

THE CRITICAL COMMUNICATIONS TIMINGS DURING THE PERIOD OF ACTIVE DEENCE PLANNING COMMITTEE PARTICIPATION WERE THOSE OF NUCLEAR CONSULTATION MESSAGES. THE TRANSMISSION TIMES OF THESE MESSAGES BOTH FROM CAPITALS AND MNCS OVER THE NATO-WIDE COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM VARIED FROM APPROXIMATELY 20 MINUTES FOR A NUCLEAR CONSULTATION MESSAGE FROM COPENHAGEN TO 3 HOURS AND 15 MINUTES FOR A WHISKEY MESSAGE FROM SACLANT.

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(ONE CORRECTED COPY OF A REQUEST MESSAGE FROM SACEUR TOOK 5 HOURS AND 15 MINUTES TO BE TRANSMITTED OVER THE NATO-WIDE COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM.) THE APPARENT REASONS FOR THESE DELAYS WERE THREEFOLD. THE EVERE TARE COMPUTER PROGRAMME IS TOO RIGID AND REJECTS MESSAGES FOR THE SLIGHTEST FORMATTING ERROR. THE TECHNICAL OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS OF THE AUTOMATED COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM WERE NOT TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION AT ALL NATIONAL AND NATO TERMINALS. THERE MAY ALSO HAVE BEEN SOME STRESS CAUSED TO OPERATORS BY A RELATIVELY INCRESED NUMBER OF HIGH PRIORITY MESSAGES. HOWEVER, IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT IN ALL CASES WHERE DIFFICULTIES WERE EXPERIENCED IN RECEIVING NATO CAPITALS' AND MNCS' NUCLEAR CONSULTATION MESSAGES, THE NATO COMCEN AT EVERE, IN AN EFFORT TO SPEED UP CIRCULATION, STARTED TO MONITOR THE IMPUT LINKS TO THE TARE.

THE MONITORED COPIES WERE THUS RECEIVED IN NATO HEADQUARTERS
EARLIER THAN THOSE TRANSMITTED AUTOMATICALLY TO OTHER
ADDRESSEES."

3. CANADA REP (CANTY) SAID THAT HIS AUTHORITIES HAVE REVIEWED
THE FIRST DRAFT OF THE COEC REPORT AND PROPOSED THE
FOLLOWING AMENDMENTS:

A. A GENERAL COMMENT IS THAT THE DRAFT REPORT IS
RESTRICTED TO DPC PARTICIPATION ONLY INSTEAD OF BEING
A REPORT ON ALL ASPECTS OF THE EXERCISE OF INTEREST TO
THE COEC. IT IS FELT THAT A BROADER VIEW SHOULD BE
TAKEN AND IT IS ON THIS BASIS THAT THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS
ARE MADE.

B. FROM THE PAUCITY OF COMMENTS CONTAINED IN
SECTION IV-OBSERVATIONS, IT IS ASSUMED THAT THE
WORKING PAPER IS INTENDED AS A SKELETAL FRAMEWORK ONLY
TO BE FLESHED OUT BY NATIONAL INPUTS AT THE COEC
DISCUSSION APRIL 17.

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C. IT IS FELT THAT THERE SHOULD BE A LEAD-IN TO
SECTION IV. THIS COULD INCLUDE MENTION OF THE FACT THAT
THE EXERCISE PROVIDED AN OPPORTUNITY TO FAMILIARIZE
PERSONNEL INVOLVED WITH BOTH NATIONAL AND ALLIANCE CRISIS
MANAGEMENT PROCEDURES. THIS INCLUDES ALLIANCE-WIDE AND
NATIONAL INTERNAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR ANALYSIS, CONSULTATION
AND DECISION-MAKING IN CRISIS SITUATIONS. IT IS FELT

THAT THERE SHOULD BE SOME POSITIVE OBSERVATIONS RELATING TO THE GENERALLY SATISFACTORY AND CREDIBLE SCENARIO WHICH PERMITTED TESTING OF THE NATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS IN TERMS OF STATE OF READINESS OF ARMED FORCES. COMMENTS IN THE LEAD-IN MIGHT ALSO DEAL WITH THE BUILD-UP PHASE (PRE-EXERCISE PERIOD) WHICH SERVED USEFULLY AND EFFECTIVELY TO INVOLVE PARTICIPANTS PRIOR TO COMMENCEMENTS OF ACTIVE PLAY IN CONTRAST TO HILEX 6. HOWEVER IN FUTURE EXERCISES THE TYPE OF INPUT REQUIRED IN THE PRE-EXERCISE PERIOD SHOULD BE MORE CLEARLY DEFINED. IF FREE PLAY IN THIS PERIOD IS EXPECTED THEN THE TERMS UNDER WHICH THIS WILL OCCUR SHOULD BE WELL UNDERSTOOD IN ADVANCE.

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D. CONCERNING DPC LIVE PLAY, PARAGRAPH 13 MIGHT BE PREFACED TO CONTAIN COMMENTS ALONG THE FOLLOWING LINES. "ALTHOUGH LIVE DPC PLAY WAS OF LIMITED DURATION, IT PROVED MOST USEFUL IN TERMS OF INTERDEPARTMENTAL CONSULTATIONS NATIONALLY AND CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN CAPITALS AND NATO DELEGATIONS. THIS CONSULTATION AS WELL AS THAT IN DPC CONTRIBUTED MATERIALLY TO THE TEST OF PROCEDURES AND COMMUNICATIONS AS WELL AS THE LEARNING PROCESS. IT SERVED TO INVOLVE PARTICIPANTS IN SOME OF THE QUESTIONS LIKELY TO ARISE IN ANY CONFLICT IN WHICH USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS WOULD BE COMTEMPLATED. IT WAS A DECIDED IMPROVEMENT OVER WINTEX 73 WHEN DPC PARTICIPTION WAS LIMITED TO TEN HOURS ONLY."

E. AFTER THE FIRST SENTENCE OF PARAGRAPH 13 THE FOLLOWING MIGHT BE INSERTED. "THE SHORTNESS OF DPC PLAY LED TO UNREALISTIC TELESCOPING OF CONSIDERATIONS REGARDING THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. IF LIVE PLAY WERE TO BE EXPANDED IN THE FUTURE, THE ARTIFICIALITY WHICH APPEARED THIS YEAR WHEN SUCH PLAY WAS LIMITED TO CONSIDERATION OF NUCLEAR REQUESTS ALONE (DESPITE THE FACT THAT OTHER IMPORTANT FACTORS SUCH AS DECLARATIONS OF WAR WERE OUTSTANDING) MIGHT BE AVOIDED. EXTENDED DPC PLAY WOULD ADD MORE EXTENSIVE AND HIGHER LEVEL PARTICIPATION IN CAPITALS".

F. THE SECOND SENTENCE OF PARAGRAPH 13 IS SOMEWHAT CONFUSING IN THAT IT SEEMS TO REFER TO THE DPC RESPONSE CELL RATHER THAN THE DPC ITSELF WHICH IS THE SUBJECT OF THE REST OF THE PARAGRAPH. IT IS FELT THAT THIS SENTENCE SHOULD BE DELETED. ALSO WHILE THE MEANING OF THE FINAL SENTENCE OF PARAGRAPH 13 CAN BE DISCERNED, THE PHRASEOLOTY COULD LEAD TO CONFISION, AND IT SUGGESTED THAT THE SENTENCE SHOULD BE DELETED. PARAGRAPH 13 COULD BE CONCLUDED ON A POSITIVE NOTE AS FOLLOWS. "WHILE IT IS REALIZED THAT MORE EXTENSIVE DPC PLAY MIGHT RAISE STAFFING PROBLEMS, THE SOLUTION TO THIS PROBLEM SHOULD

BE ACTIVELY EXPLORED SO THAT IN THE EVENT DPC SHOULD
DECIDE IN FUTURE TO EXPAND LIVE PLAY, STAFFING WOULD NOT
CONSTITUTE A PROHIBITIVE BARRIER.

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G. IT IS FELT THAT A SEPARATE PARAGRAPH SHOULD BE
DEVOTED TO THE PLAY OF THE DPC RESPONSE CELL ALONG THE
FOLLOWING LINES. "THE DPC RESPONSE CELL DECISIONS WHICH
TENDE TO BE GIVEN ON A MECHANICAL BASIS DISTRACTED FROM
THE UTILITY OF THE EXERCISE. THIS GAVE AN AIR OF UNREALITY
WHICH MADE DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL POSITIONS ALMOST
MEANINGLESS. IN FUTURE EITHER SEPARATE DPC AND MC CELLS
OR A JOINT DPC/MC CELL COMPRISED OF NATIONAL REPRESENTATIVES
ACTING AS SURROGATE PERMAMENT AND MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES
SHOULD BE CONSTITUTED WHEN DPC IS NOT PLAYING LIVE".

4. UK REP (BEAUMONT) SAID THAT HIS AUTHORITIES RECOMMEND THAT
PARA 13 BE REDRAFTED TO EMPHASIZE THE CASE FOR A MULTINATIONAL
COMMITTEE TO OPERATE WHEN THE DPC IS NOT ITSELF PARTICIPATING.
UK REP CIRCULATED THE FOLLOWING SUGGESTED REDRAFT OF PARA 13:

QUOTE.

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13. MANY PARTICIPATING NATIONS WERE EITHER HOLDING
NATIONAL FREE-PLAY EXERCISES CO-ORDINATED WITHE WINTEX OR

EXERCISING THEIR GOVERNMENTAL CRISIS/MANAGEMENT PROCEDURES. THESE NATIONS HAVE REPORTED THAT THE ABSENCE OF LIVE PLAY AT NATO HQ FROM THE START OF THE ACTIVE PHASE UNTIL CONSULTATION ON THE INITIAL USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS HAD SERIOUSLY INHIBITING EFFECT ON THE PARALLEL ACTIVITIES IN THEIR CAPITALS AND CAUSED CONFUSION IN THEIR DEALINGS WITH THE MNCS. THEY HAVE SUGGESTED THAT, WHEN THE DEFENCE PLANNING COMMITTEE IS NOT ITSELF PARTICIPATING, IT SHOULD BE REPRESENTED BY A MULTI-NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO COMPLEMENT LIVE PLAY IN CAPITALS. THIS WAS ALSO A RECOMMENDATION CONTAINED IN THE MNCS' FINAL REPORT ON WINTEX 75 (MC43/29) AND HAS ALREADY BEEN DISCUSSED BY THE DPC (DPC/R (74)25, ITEM 1). THERE MAY BE SOME DIFFICULTIES IN INVOLVING A COMMITTEE ACTING ON NATIONAL INSTRUCTIONS IN AN EXERCISE WHICH MUST OPERATE TO A TIGHT SCHEDULE, BUT, WITH FLEXIBLE PLANNING AND A WILLINGNESS ON THE PART OF CAPITALS TO ACCEPT THAT CERTAIN CRITICAL DECISIONS MUST BE TAKEN AT OR NEAR A PRE-PLANNED TIME, THESE DIFFICULTIES SHOULD NOT PROVE INSUPERABLE. STAFFING DIFFICULTIES
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THAT MAY ARISE FROM EXTENDED NATO HQ PARTICIPATION ALSO MAY BE REDUCED, IF NOT REMOVED, BOTH WITHIN NATIONAL DELEGATIONS AND THE INTERNATIONAL STAFFS, BY VARIOUS MEANS. IN VIEW OF THE CONSIDERABLE ADVANTAGES WHICH WOULD FLOW FROM SUCH AN EXTENSION OF NATO HQ PARTICIPATION, THE COEC BELIEVES THAT IT SHOULD BECOME A BASIC PLANNING PARAMETER FOR EXERCISE WINTEX 77 AND NOTES THAT THE MNCS HAVE ALREADY BEEN ASKED TO TAKE THIS INTO ACCOUNT (AC/237-DS/47).

5. COMMENTING ON UK PROPOSED REDRAFT OF PARA 13, CHAIRMAN SAID THAT THE INTERNATIONAL STAFF CANNOT PROVIDE THE NECESSARY STAFF TO SUPPORT A MULTI-NATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR EXTENDED PERIODS WHEN THE DPC IS NOT ACTIVELY PARTICIPATING IN WINTEX TYPE EXERCISES. HE POINTED OUT THAT SMALLER COUNTRIES WOULD ALSO HAVE PROBLEMS BECAUSE THE LIMITED STAFF AND EXPERTISE AVAILABLE AT THEIR DELEGATIONS PROHIBITED CONTINUOUS OPERATION OF A MULTI-NATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR EXTENDED PERIODS.

6. FRG REP (DZIACAS), NORWAY REP (SKIE) AND DENMARK REP (JENSEN) ALL POINTED OUT THAT THEIR DELEGATIONS ARE REINFORCED WITH STAFF PERSONNEL FROM CAPITALS DURING PERIODS OF CRISIS OR EXERCISES REQUIRING DPC PARTICIPATION.

7. NETHERLANDS REP (HOFMAN), BELGIAN REP (DE MILD) AND ITALY REP (CAPONE) SAID THAT THEIR DELEGATIONS COULD NOT SUPPORT THE UK PROPOSAL FOR A MULTI-NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO OPERATE WHEN THE DPC IS NOT ITSELF PLAYING BECAUSE OF THE EXPENSE INVOLVED AND THE LACK OF NECESSARY STAFF PERSONNEL AT THEIR DELEGATIONS.

8. FRG REP SAID THAT HIS AUTHORITIES SUPPORT THE UK PROPOSAL FOR A MULTI-NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO TAKE THE PLACE OF THE DPC WHEN THAT BODY IS NOT ACTIVELY PARTICIPATING. HE POINTED OUT THAT PAR-

TICIPATION IN BONN WAS AT A VERY HIGH LEVEL THROUGHOUT THE ACTIVE PHASE OF WINTEX 75 AND THAT HIS AUTHORITIES WERE DISAPPOINTED WITH THE LEVEL OF PARTICIPATION AT NATO HQ (RESPONSE CELL COMPOSED IS MEMBERS) WHEN THE DPC WAS NOT ACTIVELY PLAYING. COMMENTING ON DPC CONSULTATIONS ON NUCLEAR MATTERS, HE SAID THAT BONN FELT THAT DPC'S CONSULTATIONS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN RESTRICTED TO INITIAL RELEASE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, BUT SHOULD ALSO PLAY FOLLOW-ON USE.

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9. NETHERLANDS REP SAID THAT HIS AUTHORITIES AGREED WITH THE DRAFT COEC REPORT TO THE DPC, BUT RECOMMENDED THAT A HIGH LEVEL PLANNING GROUP PARTICIPATE IN THE PLANNING OF FUTURE WINTEX TYPE EXERCISES.

10. UK REP SUPPORTED CANADIAN PROPOSAL THAT THE COEC REPORT TO THE DPC SHOULD NOT ONLY BRING OUT THE MAJOR LESSONS LEARNED AND DIFFICULTIES EXPERIENCED IN WINTEX 75, BUT ALSO MAKE SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO MATTERS WHICH NATO HQ AND CAPITALS SHOULD TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION FOR FUTURE EXERCISES.

11. DRAWING ON REF D-E, US REP (WITKO) SAID THAT EXERCISE WINTEX 75 WAS AN EXCELLENT TRAINING VEHICLE AND ONE OF THE MAJOR LESSONS LEARNED, AS FAR AS WASHINGTON IS CONCERNED, IS THE NEED FOR, AND VALUE OF, ACTUAL DPC PLAY IN WINTEX EXERCISES. HE HOPED THAT THIS WILL BE HIGHLIGHTED IN THE TEXT AND IN THE RECOMMENDATIONS SECTION OF THE WINTEX 75 REPORT. COMMENTING ON THE EXCESSIVE TIME REQUIRED TO TRANSMIT NUCLEAR CONSULTATION MESSAGES, HE SUGGESTED THAT THE RECOMMENDATIONS SECTION OF THE REPORT STRESS THE NEED FOR TIMELY CORRECTIVE ACTION. US REP SUPPORTED UK REDRAFT OF PARA 13.

12. IS STAFF WILL PREPARE A SECOND DRAFT REPORT TO THE DPC ON EXERCISE WINTEX 75. MISSION WILL FORWARD THIS TO WASHINGTON UPON RECEIPT.

13. CHAIRMAN POINTED OUT THE DIFFICULTIES OF PREPARING A REPORT FOR THE DPC WHICH CONTAINS RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE EXERCISES AND SUGGESTED THAT THE COES CONSIDER PREPARING TWO REPORTS-ONE WHICH WOULD SUMMARIZE MAJOR LESSONS LEARNED FROM WINTEX 75, AND ANOTHER IN THE FORM OF RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE EXERCISES. COEC AGREED TO CONSIDER THIS SUGGESTION AT THEIR NEXT MEETING.

14. MISSION WILL REPORT ITEMS RAISED UNDER "ANY OTHER BUSINESS" BY SEPTEL.
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